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ABSTRACT 
In response to the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy’s call to “rapidly detect, warn, characterize, and attribute 
natural and man-made disturbances to space systems” the Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures (SCAF) Workshop 
has been pressing the community to improve skills in anomaly attribution. Five years of presentations, case 
studies, and insights have identified a clear requirement to create a spacecraft anomaly reporting standard. This 
new standard is motivated by the fact that previous anomaly investigations suffer from lack of diagnostics on 
spacecraft, limited benefit for operators to determine root cause, uncertainties in vulnerability models, and 
complicated space environment phenomena. As a result, it is important for this process to be both effective and 
efficient or else it will not be embraced. The Universal Satellite Anomalies Analysis Advisor, USA3 is a 
proposed starting point for this solution: must assign anomaly/failure root cause to the (1) lowest possible 
hardware level associated with a (2) specific causative trigger by (3) tracking symptoms in time (both in relative 
and absolute terms). The ability to discern the cause of a space system failure will become more important as 
more new space users operate new satellite systems, the orbital debris hazard continues to grow, and space 
system performance becomes more ubiquitous to everyday life on Earth. This paper provides a starting point 
that through interagency and cross-community review and refinement may evolve into an anomaly attribution 
framework standard. 
BACKGROUND 
Spacecraft anomaly attribution (i.e., determination of 
root cause) is critical for a variety of reasons. The 
ability to determine the root cause of a satellite anomaly 
provides the means to (1) validate space environmental 
models; (2) give feedback to design and parts selection; 
(3) support vulnerability and failure model 
enhancements; (4) provide input for insurance 
processing; and (5) contribute insights into geo-political 
discussions about disruption of satellite operations.  
 
At a higher level, we are striving to improve anomaly 
attribution because the U.S. National Space Policy 
2010, Presidential Directive-4, calls for us to do so: 
“Improve, develop, and demonstrate, in cooperation 
with relevant departments and agencies and 
commercial and foreign entities, the ability to rapidly 
detect, warn, characterize, and attribute natural and 
man-made disturbances to space systems of US 
interest.” 
As the space environment becomes more globalized and 
populated with first-time users, anomalies will likely 
continue to occur even as reliability of legacy space 
systems improve. 
The determination of root cause for satellite anomalies 
(i.e., anomaly attribution) is complicated by (1) the 
dynamic space environment; (2) the lack of onboard 
diagnostics to aid in anomaly investigations; (3) the 
lack of motivation of space programs to determine root 
cause and share failures with others; (4) lack of 
spacecraft (system, subsystem, and component) design 
information; (5) inconsistency between the design and 
the final state a satellite was launched; (6) the 
complexity and variability of failure modes such as 
impacts, charging, contamination, etc.; (7) the fact that 
failures often are the result of more than one trigger; 
and (8) lack of common terminology and a standard 
anomaly attribution process.1-7  
The net result of these investigations is that a new 
process for the investigation and documentation related 
to satellite anomaly attribution root cause is needed to 
enable the sharing of anomaly data community-wide to 
improve space operations assurance for all space 
systems. This new approach primarily focuses on 
solving the last of the eight issues outlined above 
understanding the importance of the context that the 
first seven issues provide.    
UNIVERSAL SATELLITE ANOMALIES 
ANALYSIS ADVISOR (USA3) 
The original direction of the anomaly attribution 
process was to look back at previous anomalies and 
start to implement a new way of examining previous 
anomalies across a variety of sources to weave together 
a unified database of anomalies. To execute this 
approach, anomalies from the following sources were 
examined (1) Satellite News Digest: open source web 
site at https://www.sat-nd.com/; (2) LEO debris events 
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compiled by D. McKnight (included in Appendix A); 
(3) NASA Goddard Space Flight Center database5; (4) 
NASA Spacecraft Anomalies Report6; (5) NASA 
SOARS/META database (only available through 
NASA); and (6) XL Catlin insurance anomalies. 
The major components of the USA3 format are: (1) 
name of anomaly; (2) Dates – event, documentation, 
and resolution; (3) Spacecraft Specifics – orbit, object 
characteristics, and state before/after event; (4) 
Symptoms 1, 2, and 3 (as appropriate); and (5) 
Attribution (i.e., root cause). This process has two 
major design objectives: 
- Trace the event to the lowest possible component 
of the spacecraft (i.e., mission effect to system to 
subsystem to component) and; 
- Recreate an accurate timeline of measurable and 
inferred events to insure that cause and effect 
hypotheses are tested sufficiently. 
The lessons learned from this investigation resulted in 
the conclusion that past anomalies databases are not of 
sufficient common terminology and process to be 
leveraged by the USA3 approach. Instead, a new 
guideline needs to be created that will enable future 
anomalies to be combined and global observations and 
insights made to assist all space users to minimize 
future failures. 
ANOMALY ATTRIBUTION PROCESS 
As a result, a new anomaly attribution process is 
proposed. There are many very robust and complete 
anomaly attribution processes already established.8-10 
These types of resources may well be referenced and 
used often during the execution of the framework 
described in this paper. 
However, the goal of this process is to create a 
guideline that is concise, readable, and compelling. In 
order for this to be the case, it cannot be complete, like 
many of these other solutions. In addition, it must be 
community-agnostic (i.e., can be used equally well for 
large military spacecraft and small commercial 
platforms). 
With that spirit in mind, there are a few key aspects that 
must exist within this “guideline” or “framework.”  
These are (1) clear objective(s), (2) standard 
terminology, (3) overarching principles, and (4) 
standard process. These four components will now be 
presented in that order. 
Clear Objectives 
There are two objectives of the proposed anomaly 
attribution process: (1) provide guidelines to 
standardize the way spacecraft anomalies are described, 
recorded, and shared to enable future anomaly reports 
to be easily combined to provide insights to enhance 
space operations assurance for the entire community; 
and (2) assemble lessons learned and insights about 
spacecraft anomaly attribution that can help spacecraft 
operators better determine the root cause. 
Objective 1 is largely satisfied by the following 
“Standard Terminology” section. The basis of applying 
best practices and disciplined anomaly investigation 
methods can only succeed if everyone is first using the 
same terms. This list of terms is an essential aspect of 
the development of this overall anomaly attribution 
guideline partially because it is so important and 
partially because it is a tedious task. 
Objective 2 is largely satisfied by the remainder of the 
guidelines. It is important to note that this document is 
striving to provide a “lean” process. That is to say, it is 
comprehensive in topics but not overly prescriptive in 
how to satisfy the. There is an emphasis on suggesting 
to only do work that efficiently contributes to a solid 
root cause determination for an anomaly. 
Standard Terminology 
The framework of what terminology needs to be agreed 
upon begins with the definition of an anomaly: A 
spacecraft anomaly is defined as a functional 
perturbation to a satellite component, subsystem, or 
system that can be traced to a manmade or natural 
trigger. Even if the “anomaly” was expected, it is still 
an anomaly to the operations of that part of the satellite. 
However, from the Orion programs11 a different 
definition for anomaly and failure are proposed: An 
anomaly is defined as any deviation of system, 
subsystem, and/or hardware performance beyond 
previously established limits. A failure is defined as the 
inability of a system, subsystem, software/firmware, 
and/or hardware to perform its required function. 
Part of the purpose of this paper is to motivate 
feedback; so, which definition of anomaly and failure 
do you prefer? Some early reviewers have suggested 
that only major permanent anomalies or failures will 
ever really be assessed using a comprehensive anomaly 
attribution process. 
The “devil is in the details” no matter which anomaly 
definition is used. The listing below provides an initial 
framework for the terms that need to be considered to 
be included in this terminology section. 
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Spacecraft Mission - the ultimate purpose of the 
satellite: 
- Remote sensing (or Earth observation) 
- Meteorology 
- Position, navigation, & timing (PNT) 
- Communications (voice, video, and data) 
- Science and astronomy 
- Manned spaceflight 
System - primary supporting function of space 
platform: 
- Payload 
- Communications (i.e., telemetry, tracking, and 
control) 
- Data Handling 
- Power 
- Propulsion 
- Attitude Determination & Control 
- Thermal Control 
- Structure 
Subsystem - key segments of a system:  
- Communications system has subsystems of antenna, 
transmitter, receiver, transponder (i.e., transmitter and 
receiver together), diplexer & switches, and signal 
processing. 
- Data handling system has subsystems of command 
unit, clock, telemetry, recorder, memory, pulse 
modulation encoder, and fault protection. 
- Power system has subsystems of batteries, fuel cells, 
power control unit, regulators/converters, wiring, and 
solar arrays.  
- Propulsion has possible subsystems of thrusters, 
propellant, tank, fuel lines, pump, nozzle, etc. 
- Attitude Determination & Control system has 
subsystems of control computer, reaction wheels, 
control moment gyros, magnetometer, Earth sensor, 
star sensor/tracker, sun sensor, horizon sensor, 
actuator/thruster, etc. 
- Thermal control system has possible subsystems of 
louvers, MLI, heat sink, electric heater, etc. 
Component - key subset of a subsystem that nominally 
serves a clear traceable purpose to a subsystem. Typical 
components of several subsystems are detailed below: 
- Battery has components of casing, electrolyte, anode, 
and cathode. 
- Star tracker has sensor, memory, processor (i.e., 
CPU), and power conditioning. 
- Signal processing has pre-amplifier, timing/control 
(clock), power conditioning, and analog-to-digital 
converter. 
Overarching Principles 
Four key principles are proposed for development of an 
anomaly attribution procedure: 
RESOLUTION: Assign the anomaly to the lowest 
hardware level possible. For example, component 
failure is more useful than system or subsystem 
degradation since there are so many possible 
components within a subsystem or system. 
 
CAUSALITY: Identify the causative phenomena (i.e., 
trigger) uniquely. For example, rather than stating 
“space weather,” determine between electron or proton 
flux or charged particles.  
 
TIMELINE: Time sequencing is very important; build a 
timeline of when symptoms occurred. Note that this 
may not be when they were first detected or observed. 
 
OPTIONS: Have you proposed three alternatives to the 
potential root cause before deciding on one to insure 
that you are not just trying to find data to support your 
first hypothesis (i.e., avoid confirmation bias). 
These four principles are not created equal. The first 
three are engineering directives that drive information 
gathering in three different dimensions: (1) Resolution 
relates to hardware (i.e., what failed); (2) Causality 
focuses on a trigger (i.e., what caused failure); and (3) 
Timeline empowers cause and effect (i.e., order of 
events). 
The last principle (i.e., develop three options before 
deciding on root cause) provides a guard against 
fixating on a root cause too soon (i.e., without 
considering dissenting options to the first viable 
option). 
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Standard Process 
The process by which these principles can be applied to 
investigate an anomaly will occur after three planning 
steps detailed below: 
Establish an Anomaly Attribution Team: 
The makeup of the anomaly attribution team is critical 
to determining a root cause. The makeup and execution 
of this team should be planned for well before any 
event. This team should reflect a diversity of insights 
from across your organization and could initially 
include12: 
- Program Manager (PM) for space platform that was 
affected: responsible for the space system’s 
performance. 
 
- Boss of PM for space platform that failed: show 
management commitment to importance of anomaly 
attribution process. 
- Primary space system operator for platform affected: 
knowledgeable of operational performance but not an 
engineer with knowledge of design; knows “function 
over form.” 
 
- Payload system lead for space platform affected: 
payload is reason for all of the other systems so 
he/she represents platform “customer.” 
 
- Power system lead for space platform affected: power 
system is integral to any anomaly so all other systems 
are sensitive to its performance. 
 
- Attitude and control system (ACS) lead for space 
platform affected: ACS is integral to any anomaly 
especially when one of the symptoms is an 
orientation perturbation. 
 
- Communication system lead for space platform 
affected: communication system is integral to any 
anomaly as cessation of communications may be the 
first indicator of some anomalies. 
 
- Thermal management system lead for space platform 
affected: thermal management system may be 
integral to some anomalies as temperature variations 
from normal may be both an intermediate indicator of 
an anomaly or the primary mission effect. 
 
- System engineer from a different space platform than 
affected: objective, but qualified, technical bystander. 
 
- Manager from a different space platform than 
affected: objective but qualified management 
bystander to lead the investigation. 
 
As the investigation progresses, some of the anomaly 
attribution team representatives (e.g., thermal 
management, etc.) may be dropped off of the team and 
others could be added. 
Retrieve System Documentation: 
The likely first step of an Anomaly Attribution Team is 
to retrieve space system documentation. Information 
about the space system that has suffered an anomaly 
may actually be very difficult to access.  
Just because you are operating a satellite does not mean 
that you actually know what the thickness of propellant 
tanks are or the number of layers of MLI or spacing 
between the MLI layers of them around a battery 
casing.  
While it may never be needed, it is prudent to start an 
operational space program with a complete set of 
documentation for the satellite you are operating. A 
good test of completeness of the documentation is 
whether it is sufficient to allow you to build a new one 
from the specifications.  
This baselining of system documentation is essential 
since once an anomaly occurs and you are trying to 
recreate a failure or test phenomenological issues, 
differences in what has been deployed to space cannot 
differ from your modeled understanding of it if you 
hope to determine root cause. 
Assemble Anomaly Information: 
The source and types of data needed depend 
significantly on the characteristics of the satellite and its 
operations. Knowing where you might find useful 
anomaly information is critical. It may come from on-
board diagnostics (e.g., telemetry from temperature 
sensors), mission performance (e.g., data being 
transmitted by system only at half of normal data rate), 
third-party observers (e.g., astronomical observers 
sensing a tumble of your, previously 3-axis stabilized, 
satellite), etc.  
It is critical that data not be filtered too soon as to what 
is relevant and what is not. Oftentimes, the leading 
candidate for the root cause might skew the 
investigation by causing the investigators to 
preferentially pay attention to data that confirms the 
first likely root cause candidate. Guard against this 
tendency to limit data assemblage too soon and based 
upon being “irrelevant” to initial theories for the 
anomaly root cause. 
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The actual execution of the four principles is largely 
done in support of the analysis. The needed activities 
are largely captured by model runs, simulations, and 
testing. 
Model Runs, Simulations, and Testing: 
The process by which a root cause is determined is 
highly iterative and includes information gathering, 
reporting, model runs, simulations, and testing in order 
to adjudicate hypotheses; in essence, determine the one 
best hypothesis. However, explaining alternative 
hypotheses that have eventually been ruled out provides 
reviewers both results and the logic to derive these 
results.  
It is also important to remember that oftentimes an 
anomaly is the result of more than one trigger acting 
over a period of time. When a minor failure (that 
produces no immediate mission effect) is coupled with 
a loss of redundancy to create an anomaly, the trigger 
for the second event (e.g., loss of redundancy) may be 
judged (erroneously) as the sole contributor to the 
reported anomaly (i.e., mission effect). 
Figure 1 displays the total anomaly attribution process: 
- Planning steps are critical to the overall 
sequence and eventual anomaly resolution; 
- Execution applies engineering and cognitive 
principles to efficiently investigate an 
anomaly; and 
- Model runs, simulations, and testing provide 
the concrete attribution information. Appendix 
C contains a comprehensive list of root cause 
attribution techniques taken from Reference 
10. 
 
Figure 1. Anomaly attribution process includes both planning before an event and execution of key 
principles afterwards. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As this process is in its infancy, the hoped-for status 
over the next year is to present this proposed process to 
as many people as possible with a focus on people with 
operational space experience.  
The goal is to be useful but not onerous so that 
everyone will be willing and excited about reading the 
guideline and can then incorporate relevant aspects of 
the process into their existing operational procedures. 
It should be noted that no matter how much we focus on 
the engineering and technical aspects of the anomaly 
attribution process, we cannot forget that the 
administrative aspects of this sequence are just as 
important; if overlooked, the entire process will fail.  
A parting observation on the difficulty of this process 
can be made when looking at how to discern if a 
spacecraft has been struck by a piece of nontrackable 
space debris. The ability to sense whether or not a 
satellite was disrupted by an orbital debris impact is not 
as easy as it might seem.  
The likely debris impactor to on operational satellite in 
LEO will be a smaller fragment, since there are more of 
them: there are over 500,000 fragments in LEO larger 
than 5mm-1cm versus 18,000 cataloged objects). 
Anomalies or failures from a debris impact will likely 
be a fast-acting effect (i.e., not a slow, steady reduction 
in performance).  
However, having a rapid reduction in solar power that 
might be attributed to a debris particle destroying a 
portion of a solar array may look identical to a 
reduction in power due to short in a solar array due to a 
charging event. 
The sequence of parameters that may not be known 
well enough to confidently attribute a cause of an 
anomaly as a debris are summarized in Figure 2. 
A test that has become more suggestive of a debris 
impact is summarized in the table of impact indicators 
provided in Appendix B. However, it is a 
straightforward requirement (though problematic in 
reality) that a debris impact can really only be verified 
by visual inspection or by having two independent, 
related observables occur simultaneously. For example, 
if the solar array power output drops by 20% instantly 
while an angular perturbation is detected for the entire 
spacecraft then particulate impact is likely to be the root 
cause.  
Similar tables to the one included in Appendix B for 
indicators of a debris impact but for other anomaly 
triggers would provide a valuable resource for future 
anomaly investigations. These would include 
electrostatic charging, total radiation dose, displacement 
damage, single event upset, contamination, and atomic 
oxygen erosion, at a minimum. 
Acknowledgments 
The evolution of the Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures 
(SCAF) Workshops over the last five years from 
scientific discussions to operational dialogues 
highlights the maturation of this community. 
The SCAF Workshops have been supported by many 
people in government, academia, and industry. 
However, the following people have invested 
significant “sweat equity” into making this sequence of 
techno-policy workshops to be a great success: Jeff 
Blackman, IAI; Chris Kunstadter, XL Catlin; Mark 
Matney, NASA/ODPO; Jonny Pellish, NASA/GSFC; 
Jesse Leitner, NASA/GSFC; and Susan Hastings, The 
Aerospace Corporation. 
Figure 2. The ambiguity of translating a change in mission performance to an impact, flux, particle, or 
even, eventually, a source requires a significant amount of information that is often not known.13 
 
 
McKnight 7 32nd Annual AIAA/USU 
  Conference on Small Satellites 
References  
1. Cheng, P., Hecht, T., and Bohner, J., “Why 
Satellites Fail: Lessons for Mission Success,” 
Aerospace Report, TOR-2009(8617)-8704, 
August 2009. 
2. McKnight, D., “Examination of Spacecraft 
Anomalies Provides Insight into Complex Space 
Environment,” 7th European Conference for 
Aeronautics and Space Sciences (EUCASS), July 
2017. 
3. Remez, J., and Simon, P., “Orbital Anomalies in 
Goddard Spacecraft,” NASA Reports from mid-
1990s through 2005. 
4. McKnight, D., “Orbital Debris Hazard Insights 
from Spacecraft Anomalies Studies,” 65th 
International Astronautical Congress, Jerusalem, 
IS, October 2015; Acta Astronautica, Volume 
126, September–October 2016, Pages 27–34. 
5. Cheng, P. and Smith, P., “Learning from Other 
People’s Mistakes,” Crosslink, Fall 2007. 
6. Spacecraft System Failures and Anomalies 
Attributed to the Natural Space Environment, 
NASA Reference Publication 1390, August 1996. 
7. Galvan, David; Falk, Brett; Welser IV, William; 
and Baiocchi, Dave, “Satellite Anomalies: 
Benefits of a Centralized Anomaly Database and 
Methods for Securely Sharing Information 
Among Satellite Operators,” RAND Report RR-
560-DARPA, 2014. 
8. Graham, Stacey and Dhallin, Arthur, “Findings 
and Lessons Learned from Operational Anomaly 
Trending and Analysis,” Aerospace Corporation 
Presentation, October 2012. 
9. Wong, B, et al, “Data Description and Format 
Specification for Launch and Space Vehicle 
Operational Anomalies,” Aerospace Report No. 
ATR-2014-01384. 
10. Duphily, Roland, “Root Cause Investigation Best 
Practices,” Aerospace Report No. TOR-2014-
02202. 
11. ESD 10034, Exploration Systems Development 
In-flight Anomaly Management Plan. 
12. As an exemplar for a successful anomaly 
attribution team, the European Space Agency’s 
team used to quickly and effectively determine 
the root cause of the Sentinel-1A anomaly in 
2017 included a spacecraft flight control expert, 
the control team manager, the mission manager, a 
flight dynamics expert, a debris expert, and 
support from the manufacturer of the solar array. 
(Source: Holger Krag, OPS-GR, ESA/ESOC) 
13. "Evaluation of MMOD Risk Predictions with 
Available On-orbit Assets", NASA Engineering 
and Safety Center Technical Assessment Report, 
March 2017. 
McKnight 8 32nd Annual AIAA/USU 
  Conference on Small Satellites 
Appendix A. LEO Potential Particulate Impact Events  
Event Object(s) Size/Mass Altitude (km) & 
Inclination 
Anomaly Date & Time Lat/Long 
Cosmos 
1934 
struck by 
debris  
Russian P/L (18985) 1988-
023A  
P/L: ~2-4m2  
700-800kg? 
950 x 1010 i=83 12/23/91 
@980km @14.3km/s 
~50N/ 
Unknown 
debris #13475 Debris:~0.6kg 
Cerise 
boom 
severed 
French Recon Sat 
(23606/1995-33B) 
~0.49 m2  50kg 656 x 681 i=98.1 07/24/1996 0948; On 
ascending pass; impact 
velocity of 14.8km/s 
@685km 
38.2S/59.7E 
Debris fragment (18208) ~0.098 m2  
~1-4.5kg? 
653 x 685 i=98.5 
SUNSAT 
(SO-35) 
South African university 
small sat 
64kg; 45/45/60cm 400 x 838km;  
i = 93° 
01/19/2001 Unknown 
JASON1 NASA/CNES 
Oceanographic sat, 2001-
55A; 26997 
Bus 1m cube with 
4m long solar arrays; 
500kg 
~1336km and 66° 03/2002 10.75S; 
59.18E 
Cosmos 
539 
Russian geodetic satellite 
(6319) 1972-102A 
6m2,600kg;2m cyl + 
solar arrays 
1340 x 1380km      
i=74 
04/21/2002 72S/36.75W 
DMSP-5B 
F5 R/B hit 
by CZ-4 
debris 
Thor Burner 2A LV (07219) 
/1974-15A 
1m2  
37.5-50kg 
775 x 885 i=99.1 1/17/05  0214; impact 
velocity of 5.7km/s 
80.6S/53W 
Chinese R/B frag (26207) 0.06m2  ~1-2kg 671 x 847 i=98.2 
Nadezhda 
2 R/B 
R/B Cyl; D=2.4m x L=6m  950x1015km; i=83 06/22/2005 Unknown 
JASON1 NASA/CNES 
Oceanographic sat, 2001-
55A; 26997 
Bus 1m cube with 
4m long solar arrays; 
500kg 
~1336km and 66° 09/2005 52.36S; 
100.4E 
Cosmos 
2251 / 
Iridium 33 
collision 
Russian Comm. Sat. (22675) ~6m2 ;  900kg 778 x 803km;  i=74 02/10/09 1656 @ 789km 
@11.6km/s 
72N/97E 
Comm. Sat. (24946) >2.6m2 560kg  785 x 794km  
i =86.4 
Iridium SV29 >2.6m2 560kg  05/24/2009 ??? 
EOS-Terra A-Train satellite NASA 6.8m long, 3.5m 
wide; 5,190kg 
705km; i=98.2° 10/13/2009 
1624GMT 
??? 
Aura NASA atmospheric science 
satellite 
1,765kg; 6.9mx2m 
body plus 18m array 
685 x685; i =98.2° 03/12/2010 Unknown 
BLITS 
altitude 
drop 
Laser ranging target (35871) ~0.023 m2 7.53 kg 832 x ~800;  i=98.6 0800 on 01/22/2013  80.6S/53W 
69.4N/38.9E 
Pegaso 
unresponsi
ve  
Ecuadorian cubesat (39151) ~0.075m2 1.2 kg 650 x 654;  i=98.1 05/22/2013 0538  62.98S/ 
90.48W 
Iridium-47 
 
Comm sat 
1997-082C 
>2.6m2 560kg 785 x 795km 
i = 86.4° 
06/07/2014 
0330 UTC 
Unknown - 
checking 
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Event Object(s) Size/Mass Altitude (km) & 
Inclination 
Anomaly 
Date & 
Time 
Lat/Long 
Pegaso 
unresponsive  
Ecuadorian cubesat 
(39151) 
~0.075m2 1.2 kg 650 x 654;  i=98.1 05/22/2013 
0538  
62.98S/ 90.48W 
Iridium-47 
 
 
Comm sat  
1997-082C 
SATNO 25106 
>2.6m2 560kg 785 x 795km  
i = 86.4° 
06/07/2014 
0330 UTC 
Unknown - checking 
Iridium-91 
 
Comm sat 
#27372 
>2.6m2 560kg 785 x 795km 
i = 86.4° 
11/30/2014 
1615UTC 
Unknown - checking 
WorldView-
2 
Payload 
#35946 
4.3mx2.5m; 7.1m 
solar arrays; 2800kg 
770km 
i= 98.54° 
07/19/16 
(5:09pm 
EST) 
Unknown - checking 
Sentinel-1A Payload 
#39634 
3.4m ×1.3 m bus; 
2,170kg 
693km sun-synch; 
i=98.18° 
08/23/16 
17:07:37U
TC 
 
Delta R/B Rocket Body 
1968-114B 
6m x 1.4m; 800kg 1,450km 
101.35° 
Unclear Unclear 
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Appendix B. Debris Impact Indicators  
 
Observable 
N
am
e 
Physical Relevance Exemptions Examples (See 
Appendix A for list 
of MMOD 
anomalies) 
Abrupt loss of 
power in tandem 
with an angular 
perturbation to a 
satellite is 
indicative of a 
particulate impact 
of a solar array. 
Sometimes the 
perturbation occurs 
without a drop in 
power in case it 
strikes a joint or 
edge of the solar 
array. 
G
h
o
st
  
“P
o
w
er
” 
T
o
rq
u
e The farther out the 
impact occurs on the 
array and the more 
massive the impacting 
object is, the greater the 
angular perturbation will 
be.  More massive 
objects impart a smaller 
percentage of their 
original momentum to 
the solar array than 
smaller (marginally or 
non-penetrating objects). 
For micrometeoroids, they 
have a tendency to vaporize 
on impact, which does not 
transfer mechanical 
momentum as well, however, 
the ejecta is released in the 
opposite direction to the 
impact direction that may 
produce a momentum 
enhancement effect (due to 
the rebounding ejecta from 
the impacted surface). 
GOES-13 (2013) 
angular perturbation 
was determined to 
have been from a 
micrometeoroid 
strike since it 
occurred during a 
helion 
micrometeoroid 
event and 
examination of the 
“rush hours” for 
GOES-13 did not 
hint at an orbital 
debris impact.  
Short in exposed 
cabling, degradation 
of thermal control, 
or start of a leak of 
propulsion system 
in tandem with an 
angular and/or 
linear perturbation 
to the spacecraft. 
H
y
b
ri
d
 C
o
m
b
in
at
io
n
 F
ai
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These subsystems are 
closer to the center of 
mass of the satellite so 
impacts on them are not 
as likely to cause an 
angular perturbation. A 
linear impulse will 
change the orbit rather 
than the orientation of 
the satellite.  
It is difficult to tell the 
difference between a 
micrometeoroid or orbital 
debris impact except that 
micrometeoroid impacts 
often create electrical 
anomalies (due to their very 
high velocities) in addition to 
the physical damage. An 
impact-induced 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 
looks similar to electrostatic 
discharge (ESD) except that 
it might correlate with a peak 
in a meteor shower and be 
counter to normal ESD 
triggers (i.e., decreasing 
solar activity and coming out 
of eclipse). 
Olympus (1993),  
ADEOS-II (2003), 
and ALOS (2011) 
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Abrupt change in 
an object’s orbit 
despite there being 
no energy source 
onboard to provide 
such a perturbation 
and no debris 
liberated. This is 
more likely in GEO 
because of the 
lower impact 
velocities. 
G
h
o
st
 I
m
p
u
ls
e A piece of nontrackable 
debris that strikes an 
object may only cause a 
change in the orbit 
without producing any 
debris. 
Meteoroids are not massive 
enough for this to typically 
occur and a debris impact in 
LEO is likely to create 
debris but not so in GEO 
where momentum might be 
absorbed fully. 
GOES-10 (2011), 
derelict payload in 
GEO graveyard, had 
its orbit altered 
abruptly (dropped 
20km) but no debris 
liberated. The 
perturbation was 
much greater than 
could have been 
expected from an 
ESD event or SRP.1 
Abrupt change in 
an object’s orbit 
despite there being 
no energy source 
onboard to provide 
such a perturbation 
but debris is 
liberated 
Im
p
u
ls
e 
an
d
 D
eb
ri
s This is difficult to 
differentiate from an 
explosion of a 
subsystem for an 
operational spacecraft 
(since there are sources 
for energy liberation 
such as battery casing 
ruptures or propulsion 
system malfunctions). 
This is more likely to occur 
in LEO with the greater 
closing velocities for orbital 
debris than in GEO. 
However, micrometeoroid 
impacts will be difficult to 
differentiate from strikes 
from nontrackable orbital 
debris but also are less 
likely to have sufficient 
linear momentum 
transferred. 
Cosmos 1934 (1991), 
DMSP rocket body 
(2005), and BLITS 
(2013). The 1991 
C1934 event was not 
discovered until 
archives were 
searched after the 
2005 DMSP rocket 
body glancing blow 
occurred. 
If two LEO 
cataloged objects 
collide, the result is 
usually at least the 
perturbation of one 
object and 
potentially the 
replacement of one 
object with a debris 
cloud. If both 
objects are large 
enough there will 
be two debris 
clouds. 
C
at
al
o
g
ed
 C
o
ll
is
io
n
 
Hypervelocity impacts 
cause the solid material 
to behave as a liquid 
creating many more 
fragments and liberating 
them in all directions 
(relative to center of 
mass of fragmented 
object). 
This is much more likely to 
occur in LEO with the 
greater closing velocities. At 
GEO, two cataloged objects 
colliding may not create as 
much trackable debris since 
it will be a much slower 
impact velocity. 
Cerise (1996) and 
Iridium/Cosmos2251 
(2009).  Cerise 
continued to function, 
though below normal 
performance levels, 
for years after the 
encounter. 
In LEO, if the event 
occurs near the 
object’s apex (i.e., 
near its highest 
northerly or highest 
southerly latitude) 
it is likely an orbital 
debris collision. 
A
p
ex
 T
re
n
d
 
Collision hazard for a 
typical (i.e., high 
inclination object, i > 
50°) LEO satellite is 
lower near equator and 
higher near apex. 
This holds only for LEO 
high inclination (i > 50°) 
objects. 
Of the five known 
encounters between 
trackable debris, four 
have occurred above 
70° N or S; Cosmos 
539, Cosmos 1934, 
Iridium-33, and 
DMSP R/B. Cerise 
occurred at 38°S. 
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In GEO, if the 
anomaly occurred 
during a “rush 
hour,” then it is 
indicative of a 
debris impact. R
u
sh
 H
o
u
r 
T
re
n
d
 
The timing of debris 
impacts on a station-
kept GEO satellite from 
derelict objects or debris 
will occur in regular 
intervals called “rush 
hours.” 
Not all debris syncs up with 
the “conga line” motion: 6-8 
tracked objects (out of 
nearly 800) at any time have 
been seen to move counter 
to this motion. High area-to-
mass objects may be 
perturbed by SRP and, 
therefore, present a collision 
hazard out of the “rush 
hours.” These objects 
would, however, likely 
spend very little time in the 
vicinity of GSO assets so the 
collision probability is very 
low. 
No examples 
An anomaly that is 
temporary and/or is 
repeated is not 
likely to be debris-
induced. 
M
u
lt
ip
le
 (
S
ep
ar
at
e)
, 
T
em
p
o
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Impacts are rare events 
so it is exceedingly 
unlikely to have 
multiple on same 
satellite…  
…unless it is close to a 
recently produced cloud 
(e.g., below a sloughing 
object or conjuncting a 
debris cloud from a recent 
breakup). If a particle 
impacts a non-critical 
surface, there may be a 
temporary pointing anomaly 
that may be correctable (i.e., 
temporary). 
No examples 
Multiple systems 
fail simultaneously 
while power is still 
intact yet no debris 
is produced. 
 
 
M
u
lt
ip
le
 S
im
u
lt
an
eo
u
s Assumed the only way 
for this to happen is for 
a fragment to knock out 
several systems at once. 
It would seem that 
debris would likely be 
produced from such an 
event. 
If all systems are controlled 
by the same satellite central 
processor, failure of this 
component due to deep 
internal charging or 
disruption by a high energy 
particle could spoof this 
failure mode.  
SUNSAT-35 (2001) 
claimed this failure 
mode, but no debris 
was observed. 
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Appendix C.  Root cause attribution (RCA) techniques pros and cons.10 
RCA Method Pros Cons 
Brainstorming Good technique for identifying 
potential causes and contributing 
factors. 
Is a data gathering technique, not a 
classification and prioritization 
process. 
Cause and Effect Diagram 
(Fishbone) 
Permits consideration of many 
different items. 
Enables planning, executing, and 
recording results for multiple 
investigative paths in parallel. 
Inability to easily identify and 
communicate potential inter-
relationship between multiple items. 
Best suited for simple problems with 
independent causes. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Help to understand logic leading to 
event. 
Many software tools are available. 
Requires knowledge of the process. 
FTA typically used as trial and error 
method in conjunction with a parts 
list. 
Advanced Cause and Effect 
(ACEA) 
Good tool for complex problems 
with dependent causes. 
Requires thorough understanding of 
cause and effect relationships and 
their interactions. 
Cause Mapping Can be large or small depending on 
complexity of scenario. 
Allows for clear association 
between causes and corrective 
actions, with a higher likelihood of 
implementation. 
Difficult to learn and use. 
Why-Why Charts A good tool for simple problems 
with dependent causes. 
Typically, based on attribute-based 
thinking rather than a process 
perspective. 
Process Classification 
Cause and Effect (CE) 
Diagram 
Easy to construct and allow the 
team to remain engaged in the 
brainstorming activity as the focus 
moves from one process to the 
next. 
Invite team to consider conditions 
and events between the process 
steps that could potentially be a 
primary cause of the problem. 
Similar potential causes may 
repeatedly appear at the different 
process steps. 
 
